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Abstract 
Prior  to  the  industrial  revolution,  the  predominant  form  of  economic 
organization in western Europe and north America was the guild.  Guilds were 
network forms, loose associations of independent producers, with strong local 
and regional identities, in which cooperation and competition were combined.  
The decline of the guild was brought about in large part by legal changes which 
privileged the emerging conjunction of the vertically integrated enterprise and 
mass consumer market.  If present-day network forms are not be consigned to 
the margins of capitalism as their predecessors were, we need a set of legal 
concepts  and  techniques  which  can  underpin  and  protect  network  relations, 
most importantly in the context of competition law.   
 
JEL Classification: K21, L14, L22 
 




I am grateful for comments received from Ana Lourenço, Steve Pratten and 
Frank  Wilkinson,  and  from  the  participants  at  the  conference  ‘Contractual 
networks:  legal  issues  of  multilateral  cooperation’,  held  at  Fribourg,  6-9 



















Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found at the 
following address: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk 
   1 
The Return of the Guild?   







As Marc Amstutz and Gunther Teubner put it,
1 one of the challenges posed by 
the rise of the network form in the final decades of the twentieth century was its 
incompatibility  with  the  legal  categories  of  contract  and  association, 
corresponding roughly to the division between market and enterprise, which 
had been predominant since the industrial revolution.  This chapter seeks to take 
up the challenge of more precisely locating network forms in relation to the 
long-run  process  of  industrialization  and  in  assessing  the  relevance,  in  this 
context, of the legal framework of enterprise.  How would we view the network 
phenomenon if, instead of seeing it as a manifestation of the ‘post-industrial 
society’  of  the  late-twentieth  century,  as  argued  by  Manuel  Castells,
2  we 
recognized  that  network  forms  also  preceded  the  emergence  of  the  modern 
industrial enterprise?   
 
Prior  to  the  industrial  revolution,  the  predominant  form  of  economic 
organization  in  western  Europe  and  north  America  was  the  corporate  guild.  
Guilds possessed many of the features now associated with networks.  Guilds 
were neither firms not markets, but loose associations of independent producers, 
with strong local or regional identities, in which cooperation and competition 
were combined, and the benefits of innovation shared by the trade as a whole.  
The values expressed by guild forms were those of communitarianism, producer 
solidarity,  and  the  defence  of  the  collective  property  of  the  trade  as  an 
‘intellectual  commons’.  These  same  values  could  also  be  interpreted  as 
collusion, restriction and exclusion – literally, as the English judges put it in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a ‘conspiracy’ against consumers and the 
interests of wider society.  At the same time as the common law was reshaping 
the boundaries of criminal and civil liability for unlawful ‘combinations’ and 
developing  the  doctrine  of  ‘restraint  of  trade’,  guild  forms  were  also  being 
condemned  by  the  legislation  of  the  French  Revolution  and  by  the  post-
revolutionary codes on the continent of Europe.  But while the decline of the 
guilds paved the way for the emergence of the integrated business enterprise, 
the transition was far from seamless; and elements of the guild lived on under 
conditions of industrial capitalism, albeit in niches and segments which were 
continuously under threat of encroachment. 
   2 
The guild and the network are not synonymous; but the guild does represent a 
particular  subdivision  of  the  network  form,  based  as  it  is  on  ‘lateral  or 
horizontal  patterns  of  exchange,  interdependent  flows  of  resources,  and 
reciprocal lines of communication’.
3  Using an historical perspective, the fate of 
the guild may be particularly instructive.  This chapter will argue that if present-
day network forms are not be consigned to the margins of (post-) industrial 
capitalism  as  their  predecessors  were,  we  need,  if  not  necessarily  a  legal 
analogue to the network form, then at the very least a set of legal concepts and 
techniques which can underpin and protect network relations, in the same way 
that the law permits the organization of firms and markets.   
 
With that end in view, the argument in this chapter unfolds as follows.  The 
next  section  considers  some  issues  concerning  the  economic  and  legal 
definitions of the network form, and the relationship between networks, markets 
and firms.  Then the focus shifts to an historical analysis of the legal changes 
which, firstly, underpinned guild relations, and then accompanied their decline.  
This is followed by an outline of the role played by competition law and policy 
in reshaping organizational boundaries in a prototypical ‘post-industrial’ sector, 
the cultural industries.  This is followed by the concluding section. 
 
 
‘Market’, ‘Firm’ and ‘Network’ as Economic and Legal Concepts 
 
A key question is whether markets, firms and networks are mutually exclusive 
categories.  Transaction cost economics in the tradition of R.H. Coase
4 and 
Oliver  Williamson
5  portrays  firms  and  markets  as  alternative  modes  of 
economic  organization.    However,  it  has  not  been  convincingly  shown  that 
networks form a distinctive form of governance in this sense.  Jeffrey Bradach 
and Robert Eccles,
6 having identified ‘price, authority and trust’ as potentially 
alternative  mechanisms  of  coordination  for  the  market,  firm  and  network 
respectively, in the end have to accept that these are no more than ideal types 
which are useful in model-building, and do not represent the reality of industrial 
organization.  As control mechanisms, while they may be ‘separate’, they are 
also, in practice, ‘overlapping, embedded, intertwined, juxtaposed and nested’.  
The assumption of mutual exclusivity, these authors conclude, ‘obscures rather 
than clarifies our understanding’.
7   
 
Walter Powell, likewise, sets off with the aim of identifying ‘a coherent set of 
factors that make it meaningful to talk about networks as a distinctive form of 
coordinating  economic  activity’.
8    Networks,  in  his  presentation,  are  ‘more 
social  –  that  is,  more  dependent  on  relationships,  mutual  interests  and 
reputations’
9  than  markets,  while  ‘less  guided  by  a  formal  structure  of   3 
authority’
10  than  hierarchies.    As  distinct  from  markets,  networks  embody 
mechanisms for social learning and information transfer, while, by contrast with 
hierarchies, they depend on a ‘mutual orientation’ and norms of reciprocity.
11  
The difficulty with this analysis is that the characteristics described by Powell 
as belonging specifically to networks can convincingly be ascribed to the other 
two forms as well.  Markets, as F.A. Hayek has shown,
12 function to mobilize 
and encode knowledge; while Hayek’s account perhaps overplays the extent to 
which this is a necessary or universal feature of market-based activity, but it is 
unquestionably present in many market settings.  Conversely, many enterprises, 
if clearly not all, exhibit a high degree of trust and cooperation between workers 
and  managers,  without  losing  their  character  as  hierarchical  modes  of 
organization.   
 
Despite all this, there is a case for regarding networks as possessing distinctive 
features.  The problem with the existing accounts is that they start with the 
Coasean assumption that firms and markets are alternatives; the firm displaces 
the market as the costs of organizing transactions through external exchange 
increase.  This is, essentially, a static presentation, offering at best, as Coase put 
it, a ‘moving equilibrium’.
13  From an evolutionary or historical perspective, the 
firm and the market have to be seen not as alternatives, but as complements to 
one another.  The rise of the vertically integrated enterprise, and the related 
organizational  techniques  of  mass  production,  went  hand  in  hand  with  the 
emergence of markets based on mass consumption of standardized goods.  In 
the language of modern systems theory, we might say that they ‘co-evolved’.
14  
The  process  was  spelled  out  –  although  without  using  this  particular 
terminology  –  in  J.R.  Commons’s  classic  and,  latterly,  unduly  neglected 
account of industrial evolution, which appeared in 1909 (in the now unlikely 
setting of the Quarterly Journal of Economics).
15  Commons’s highly detailed, 
‘micro-institutional’ analysis tracks the evolution of the footwear industry in 
America, from the guilds of the early colonial period, through to the factory 
labour of the age of mass production.  As Commons recognized, the original or 
‘primitive’
16 guild ‘represented the union in one person of the later separated 
classes of merchant, master and journeyman’.
17  Its principal function was to 
exclude ‘bad ware’,
18 which often amounted in practice to shifting contractual 
risk on to the consumer.  The subsequent fragmentation of the guild was simply 
not  the  result,  Commons  argued,  of  changes  in  the  technological  or 
organizational forms of production, although these played a part; it was the 
consequence  above  all  of  the  development  or  ‘widening  out’  of  product 
markets.
19  This led to the separation of wholesale and retail product markets 
and thereby to a decisive shift in economic power from producers to consumers: 
‘thus it is that the ever-widening market from the custom-order stage, through 
the retail shop and wholesale-order to the wholesale-speculative stage, removes   4 
the journeyman more and more from his market, diverts attention to price rather 
than  quality  and  shifts  the  advantage  in  the  series  of  bargains  from  the 
journeymen  to  the  consumers  and  their  intermediaries’.
20    These  changes 
occurred without a major shift in the techniques of production and prior to the 
emergence  of  the  factory,  which  in  Commons’s  account  is  simply  the 
accompaniment to the final stage in the extension of the market, which he saw, 
in the age of mass production, as encompassing ‘the world’. 
21 
 
To identify vertical integration with the extension of markets to a global level 
jars with the more recent association of globalisation with a ‘flexible’, post-
industrial  and,  fundamentally,  fragmented  economic  structure.
22    But  what 
Commons  was  describing  was  a  process  which  contemporary  commentators 
understood  as  disempowering  labour.  In  the  early  years  of  the  twentieth 
century,  vertical  integration  was  resisted  by  craft-based  unions  and  small 
producers alike, aware that it signaled a threat to their independence.
23  The 
legal category of the ‘contract of employment’ was emerging at this time in 
large part as a consequence of a desire by employers for a unitary status which 
embodied the ‘subordination’ of all waged and salaried workers to the authority 
of  management.
24    We  have  since  become  used  to  thinking  of  the  large, 
vertically integrated corporation, and the ‘permanent’ or indeterminate contract 
of employment, as institutions protective of the interests of labour, which have 
been placed under threat by the fragmentation of the firm; but this is not how 
they began, and not how Commons, writing in 1909, would have seen them. 
 
In  stressing  the  coevolution  of  firms  and  markets  as  a  consequence  of  the 
extension of competition, Commons’s account also points to the marginalisation 
of network forms.  If the firm and the market were complementary, their joint 
rise pushed network relations to the fringes.  This was the consequence, on the 
one hand, of the incorporation of independent units into the firm, and, on the 
other,  of  the  eclipse  of  customized  production  by  mass  consumer  markets.  
Networks  survived,  but  in  isolated  contexts,  segments  and  niches,  which 
struggled  to  survive  when  placed  into  direct  competition  with  integrated 
industrial forms.  
 
To sum up this part of the argument: networks are indeed a distinctive form, but 
they provide an alternative mode of economic organization not to firms on the 
one hand and  markets on  the other, but  to the conjunction  of the  vertically 
integrated  firm  and  mass  consumer  markets.      As  part  of  the  unfolding  of 
industrial capitalism, networks were for the most part marginalized by the firm-
market conjunction.  They never disappeared altogether, and in some contexts 
they thrived, but these situations were the exception.   
   5 
What was the role of the legal-institutional framework in this process?  The 
next section considers the role of changes in the legal framework in England 
which accompanied the transition to industrial capitalism. 
 
 
The Legal Structure of Guild Production and the Transition to Industrial 
Capitalism in England 
 
Guild production in early modern England was not a hold-over or relic of the 
medieval period.  Historical research  has  recently re-evaluated the  role of the 
guilds, suggesting that they were far from being the obstructive force portrayed by 
the political economy of the time.  They appear to have played a significant role in 
sustaining the ‘proto-industrial’ forms of production, based on complex chains of 
contractual  relations  between  merchants,  wholesalers  and  producers,  which 
characterized  industry  before  the  coming  of  the  factory.
26    Guilds  were 
underpinned at this time by an elaborate and extensive legal structure.
27  As late as 
the  mid-eighteenth  century,  it  was  still  necessary  to  serve  a  seven  year 
apprenticeship in order to again entry to certain artisanal trades.  The status of 
apprenticeship was only partially integrated into the cash economy – it involved 
payment in kind and living in as part of the master’s household.  Journeymen 
were those who had completed their apprenticeships in the relevant trade; they 
were generally paid wages at a daily rate, although they were normally hired for 
longer than this.   A journeyman could be admitted to the group of masters not 
simply  on  showing  that  he  had  the  resources  and  qualifications  to  be  an 
independent trader, but also according to the rules of the guild which placed strict 
limits on the numbers of masters.  At this stage the terms ‘master’ and ‘employer’ 
were not synonymous.
28  The ‘master’ was one who had the right to direct the 
apprentices and journeymen he employed by virtue of his knowledge of the trade, 
and  in  many  instances  his  status  as  a  freeman  of  the  relevant  guild  or  city 
corporation.    The  master  could,  in  turn,  be  ‘employed’  as  an  independent 
contractor  on  either  a  regular  or  intermittent  basis  by  third  parties  such  as 
merchants or wealthy clients.   
 
The  artisanal  system  can  be  distinguished  from  the  capitalist  forms  of 
employment which developed later by the preservation of control over the form 
and pace of work by the ‘trade’, in other words, the collectivity of producers who 
were subject to the rules of guild membership.  The master’s relationship with his 
suppliers  and  customers,  even  when  regular  and  stable,  was  never  that  of  an 
employee  (as  that  term  later  came  to  be  understood),  while  a  journeyman, 
although paid wages which were calculated by the day or by the piece, could only 
be directed to work within the limits of his apprenticed trade, while at the same 
time  being protected from low wage competition by restrictions on the numbers   6 
of apprenticeships numbers and by the general controls on entry into the trade.  
Thus the ‘artisan wage relationship’ was one in which the journeyman ‘worked 
with, nor for, his master, and during slack times he was likely to be kept on for as 
long  as  the  master  could  manage’,  while  the  guild  rules  gave  the  master  a 
‘protective independence ... [which] existed within a body of custom and law 




The rules of the guilds were underpinned by the Statute of Artificers of 1562, a 
legislative measure which, to a large degree, codified laws going back to the 
fourteenth  century  and  local  practice  with  an  even  longer  lineage.    The 
apprenticeship sections of the Statute of 1562 were to some extent a liberalizing 
influence:  they  made  earlier  property  qualifications  applying  to  parents  of 
apprentices less onerous, and they introduced a number of exemptions to the 
rules on entry as concessions to some of the larger corporate guilds.
30  In other 
respects, however, the Statute confirmed the guild model.  Under the Statute it 
was an offence punishable by repeated fines of forty shillings for each month for 
any person to ‘set up, occupy, use or exercise any craft, mystery or occupation 
now used or occupied within the realm of England and Wales, except he shall 
have been brought up therein seven years at the least as an apprentice’.
31  The 
Statute also made it an offence to employ persons who had not been properly 
apprenticed in these occupations and to employ more than three apprentices for 
each  journeyman.
32    In  addition,  in  certain  cities,  including  the  major  urban 
centres of London and Norwich, there was regulation in the form of by-laws made 
by  the  local  guilds  and  city  corporations.    Numerous  corporations  and  guilds 
which  had  been  established  by  royal  charter  had  the  power  to  exercise  legal 
controls  over  local  trade  and  conditions  of  employment,  subject  to  minimal 
supervision by local justices.
33   
 
The  effect  of  these  provisions  was  that  the  emerging  capitalist  forms  of 
industrial organisation, based around the vertically integrated enterprise, were, 
in effect, unlawful.  No employer could operate in an industry for which he had 
not served an apprenticeship.  The Act could also be interpreted as preventing 
an employer from hiring workmen from different trades to work alongside each 
other, since the effect would be that he was then exercising a number of trades in 
addition to his own.
34  
 
The regulatory scope of Act was tested in the King’s Bench in Hobbs v. Young 
(1689).
35  Even at early stage in industrialisation, it is possible to see the pressures 
to which the Act was being subjected by the new model of economic organisation.  
A merchant-capitalist who had employed journeymen clothworkers in his house   7 
for a month to make goods up for export was successfully prosecuted for a breach 
of the Act.  The argument of the prosecuting Counsel was that  
 
‘he who cannot use a mystery himself, is prohibited to employ any 
other men in that trade; for if this should be allowed, then the care 
which has been taken to keep up mysteries, by erecting guilds or 
fraternities, would signify little’.   
 
The majority of the court agreed: 
 
‘the exercise of [the trade] by journeymen and master workmen, or 
an overseer for hire, is not an exercise of it by them, but by him that 
employs them; he provided them materials and tools, and paid them 
wages: by law, he is esteemed the trader who is to run the loss and 
hazard;  the  whole  managery  was  to  be  for  his  profit,  and  the 
workmen are to have no advantage but their wages’. 
 
Even then, one of the three judges dissented on the grounds that  
 
‘no encouragement was ever given to prosecutions upon this Statute 
...  it  would  be  for  the  common  good  if  it  were  repealed,  for  no 
greater punishment can be to the seller than to expose goods for sale, 
ill wrought, for by such means he will never sell more’. 
 
By  the  early  nineteenth  century  this  view  had  become  the  new  orthodoxy.  
However, the demise of the extensive regulatory framework of the 1563 Act was 
not a sudden event.  There was no equivalent to the peremptory prohibition of the 
guilds which was embodied in the relevant legislation of the French Revolution, 
the decret Allarde and loi Le Chapelier.  In England, the process of change was 
more gradual, but highly contested over a century or more.  Thus the statute of 
1814
36 which finally abolished the apprenticeship  provisions  of the  Statute of 
Artificers brought about a change which more than purely symbolic.  The 1814 
Act  was  passed  precisely  because  there  had  been  a  vigorous  and  concerted 
attempt  to  uphold  the  Act  of  1562  by  its  supporters  in  the  urban  guilds,  a 
campaign  which  involved  extensive  strike  action  as  well  as  parliamentary 
petitions and litigation aimed at enforcing the Act’s provisions.
37   
   8 
The Act of 1562 received a hostile interpretation from the courts almost from the 
very  start.    Looking  back  on  this  process  in  a  1792  judgment,  Lord  Kenyon 
commented: 
 
‘When  [the  Act]  was  made,  those  who  framed  it  might  find  it 
beneficial, but the ink with which it was written was scarce dry, ere 
the inconvenience of it was perceived; and Judges falling in with the 
sentiments of policy entertained by others have lent their assistance 
to repeal this law as much as it was in their power’.
38 
 
The principal weapon used by the courts was the doctrine of restraint of trade.   
Under this legal doctrine, ‘at common law, no man could be prohibited from 
working  in  any  lawful  trade  ...  and  therefore  the  common  law  abhors  all 
monopolies’.
39   Such restraints required either ‘ancient custom’ or an Act of 
Parliament:  thus  ‘without  an  Act  of  Parliament,  none  can  be  in  any  manner 
restrained from working in any lawful trade… ordinances for the good order and 
government of men of trades and mysteries are good, but not to restrain anyone in 
his lawful mystery’.
40  On this basis, courts struck down rules imposing additional 
entry requirements on apprentices and seeking to limit guild numbers.
41  Then the 
courts went further, ruling that the 1562 Act only applied even in the case of a 
pre-1562 trade trades if, in the court’s view,  ‘an apprenticeship could possibly be 
expedient‘, since the Act could only govern ‘such trades as imply mystery and 
craft, and that require skill and experience’.
42 
 
The  second  technique  used  by  the  courts  was  the  restrictive  interpretation  of 
statutes deemed to have carved out an exception from the general common law.  
In was on this basis that the courts ruled that the Act of 1562 had no application to 
trades  or  techniques  which  had  not  existed  at  the  time  of  its  passage.
43  This 
doctrine was used in the eighteenth century to remove from the scope of the Act 
several  of  the  emerging  industrial  trades  including  cotton  spinning,  coach 
building, and framework knitting.  In The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith caught 
the prevailing view, arguing that ‘the manufactures of Manchester, Birmingham 
and Wolverhampton, are many of them, upon this account, not being within the 
statute, not having been exercised in England before the 5th. of Elizabeth’,
44 ‘the 
pretence that corporations [i.e. guilds] are necessary for the better government 
of  the  trade’,  he  went  on,  ‘is  without  any  foundation’,  since  ‘the  real  and 
effectual  discipline  which  is  exercised  over  a  workman,  is  not  that  of  his 
corporation, but that of his customers’.
45   
 
Hobbs v. Young was decisively circumvented ten years before the publication of 
The Wealth of Nations, in a judgment of Lord Mansfield in Raynard v. Chase in 
1756.
50  This ruling decided that a non-apprenticed merchant or financier could be   9 
the owner of a business and employ others in it without infringing the Act if he 
acted in a partnership with one who was qualified in the relevant trade.  By these 
means the courts relaxed the prohibition on workers from different trades being 
employed alongside one another.
51  In other cases the courts took a loose view of 
the entry requirements themselves.  in Smith v. Company of Armourers (1792)
52 
the  Court  of  King’s  Bench  ordered  the  defendant  company  to  admit  to 
membership the manager of an iron foundry, on the grounds that, although he had 
not  served  an  apprenticeship  and  ‘did  not  know  how  to  manufacture  the 
commodity by his own personal labour’, he had been employed in the business for 
seven years ‘during the greatest part of which time he conducted the whole of 
their extensive works, received all the orders, gave directions to the workmen etc. 
... he knew how to conduct the business as well as any master in London’.
53   
Finally, just prior to the  repeal of the  Act, in Kent  v. Dormay  (1811)
54 Lord 
Ellenborough CJ simply refused to convict an unapprenticed textile mill owner, 
on the grounds that  
 
the valuable mills at Wakefield, Leeds etc., the property of several 
persons of the first families in this kingdom; but who would be liable 
to  informations,  or  would  be  required  to  serve  regular 
apprenticeships as millers, if the defendant could be considered as 
within the meaning of the Statute. 
 
Underlying the repeal of the apprenticeship provisions in 1814 was the political 
economy of the time, which argued for the desirability of unhindered competition.  
Joseph  Chitty’s  textbook  on  Apprenticeship,  which  had  appeared  in  1812  in 
response to the demand caused by ‘numerous recent prosecutions’ under the Act 
of 1562, drew on Adam Smith, T.R. Malthus and Wiliam Paley to advocate the 
Statute’s  repeal.    The  efforts  to  see  the  law  enforced  ‘have  been  uniformly 
instituted, not with a view to any advantage that might result to the public, but 
purely on behalf of journeymen, in order to keep up the high price of wages’; 
repeal  would  bring  about  that  ‘competition  incident  to  the  freedom  of 
employment’ which Adam Smith had argued for, with benefits for all: 
 
‘Where  there  is  free competition, the labour and capital of every 
individual  will  always  be  directed  by  him  into  the  channel  most 
conducive  to  his  own  ultimate  interest;  of  that  interest  each  is 
himself, from a thousand circumstances, the best possible judge; and 
the  interests  of  the  whole  community  must  in  general  be  most 
effectually insured, when that of each individual is most judicially 
consulted’.
59   10 
Lord Kenyon had earlier asserted that the ‘natural reason’ of the market, rather 
than guild controls, was the appropriate solution for the manufacture of poor 
quality goods:  ‘[t]he reason for making [the Act] was that bad commodities 
might not be spread abroad; but natural reason tells us, that if the manufacture is 
not good, there is no danger of its having a favourable reception in the world, or 
answering the tradesman’s purpose’.
60  
 
The social upheaveal which accompanied the defence of the Act 1562 can be seen 
as a last effort to shore up a decaying legal and economic order.  Yet, this was 
never simply a matter of resistance to technological change.  The violent Luddite 
protests in Nottinghamshire in 1811-12 began when local magistrates refused to 
convict hosiery employers who were acknowledged to have flouted local norms 
governing  the  use  of  non-apprenticed  labour  and  respect  for  customary  wage 
levels.  Machine-breaking was the response to the spread of these ‘illegal’ terms 
and conditions of employment.  As E.P. Thompson suggested, Luddism arose ‘at 
the crisis-point in the abrogation of paternalist legislation…a violent eruption of 
feeling against unrestrained industrial capitalism, harking back to an obsolescent 
paternalist code’.
61  But for the defenders of the guild model, the refusal of the 
courts to enforce trade controls was also an ‘unconstitutional’ expropriation of the 
‘mystery’ or property of the trade.  Machine breaking was simply the traditional 
sanction  for  breach  of  the  customary  rules  of  guild  production.    As  Martin 
Daunton has more recently put it: 
 
‘The response of workers should not be interpreted in terms of 
disorder and ineffectuality, but as part  of a well-developed and 
articulate ‘corporate discourse’ which stressed stability, regulation, 
and the need to observe strict limits to innovation which threatened 
independence and accountability.  Workers threatened by the rise 
of  ‘dishonourable  trades’  appealed  for  the  state  to  protect  their 
property  in  skill  in  the  same  way  as  other  property,  and  to 
recognize their social value.  The rejection of legislative support 
for this set of assumptions was political, and workers continued to 
press  for  its  restoration.    Luddites  who  continued  to  urge  the 
implementation of laws which no longer existed were, according 
to some historians, not adjusting to new realities.  This fails to 
comprehend their attitudes and assumptions, and gives priority to 
the ideology of their opponents’.
62 
 
The upheaval which accompanied the demise of the guilds arguably had long-
standing consequences for British industrialization.  On the continent, the post-
revolutionary codes repeated the condemnation of the ‘corporations’ of the ancien 
regime which had been embodied in the loi Le Chapelier of 1791.  But beneath   11 
this sweeping legal prohibition, certain aspects of guild production were carried 
over  into  emerging  forms  of  industrial  organization.  A  combination  of 
competition  and  cooperation,  and  the  preservation  of  solidaristic  ties  between 
independent producers, came to characterize the ‘industrial districts’ of Italy and 
their equivalents in France, Germany and Japan, which economists rediscovered 
in the final  decades of the twentieth century.
63  In Britain,  organizational ties 
across  independent  production  units  were  much  more  tenuous  than  on  the 
continent, a reflection, to some degree, of common law values which were hostile 
to  ‘restraint  of  trade’,  but  also  a  legacy  of  a  particular  pattern  of  industrial 
development.  In Britain, although guild relations persisted in the craft-based trade 
unionism,  centred  on  the  institution  of  the  closed  shop,  collectivism  on  the 
employer side was weak and reactive.  Industrial concentration and an increasing 




Recently,  this  trend  has  been  reversed.    Is  it  possible  to  see  in  the  vertical 
disintegration  of  production  and  the  growth  of  network  forms  of  economic 
organisation, a revival of the guild?   
 
 
Contracting in Today’s ‘Network Economy’: Vertical Disintegration in 
Broadcasting 
 
According  to  the  thesis  influentially  advanced  by  Manuel  Castells,
65  a 
combination of technological and organisational changes produced, at the end of 
the twentieth century, a reconfiguration of capitalism, which saw the rise of a 
‘network society’.  In Castells’s model, the ‘network’ infuses both the market and 
the firm, displacing the (by now) traditional vertically integrated firm with more 
loosely-coupled organizational units, and dividing mass consumption markets into 
distinctive  segments.    Product  market  deregulation,  the  liberalisation  of  trade 
flows and the growing role of the capital markets in restructuring firms play their 
part in ushering in a globalised economic system.  In this account, it is however 
technology, above all, which is driving social and economic change, as it was 
(according to Castells) in the original industrial revolution.  The ‘networking’ 
logic of new information technology and the life sciences is reproduced in the 
flexible social structures of the ‘new economy’: ‘the “spirit of informationalism” 
is  the  culture  of  “creative  destruction”  accelerated  to  the  speed  of  the  opto-
electronic  circuits  that  process  its  signals’.    Schumpeter  meets  Weber  in  the 
cyberspace  of  the  network  enterprise’.
66    Within  this  new  frame,  the  basic 
economic  unit  is  neither  the  individual  subject,  nor  a  collectivity  such  as  the 
corporation or the state, but the network itself, ‘made up of a variety of subjects   12 
and  organizations,  relentlessly  modified  as  networks  adapt  to  supportive 
environments and market structures’.
67 
 
The  essential  question  in  assessing  Castells’s  thesis  is  whether  the  trends  he 
describes amount to a genuinely new phenomenon, or simply another phase in the 
familiar dynamic of industrial capitalism, with its conjunction of the enterprise 
and the market.  In the spirit of Commons’s ‘micro-institutionalism’, a study of 
industrial evolution in the context of a particular industrial sector may help.  The 
cultural  industries,  and  television  production  in  particular,  are  an  appropriate 
sector to choose, since there we find all the elements of the ‘new economy’: a 
prominent role for information technology (represented here above all by the shift 
to  digital  broadcasting),  the  vertical  disintegration  of  established  firms,  the 
seeming reconstruction of economic relations in the form of malleable network 
forms.   Above all, we find an element which while not completely absent from 
Castells’s account, is not especially prominent either: a role for competition law a 
catalyst for economic change.
68   
 
Broadcasting in the UK is a particularly interesting case since we can see there 
two parallel attempts to foster network relations in place of vertically integrated 
organisational structures: on the one hand, government encouragement for the 
growth  of  an  independent  production  sector,  supported  by  quotas  for 
subcontracting and a specialised set of contractual terms of trade; on the other, 
an  ‘internal  market’  within  the  main  terrestrial  broadcaster,  the  BBC, 
‘mimicking’ contractual relations within an organisational frame.  The entire 
structure continues to be supported directly or indirectly by a substantial degree 
of public funding, and is heavily regulated.   
 
The  process  of  institutional  change  began  in  the  mid-1980s  with  the 
government-commissioned  Peacock  Report  which  set  out  a  vision  for 
broadcasting  of  ‘a  sophisticated  system  based  on  consumer  sovereignty’  in 
which it was recognised that ‘viewers and listeners are the best ultimate judges 
of their own interests, which they can best satisfy if they have the option of 
purchasing  the  broadcasting  services  they  require  from  as  many  alternative 
sources of supply as possible’.
69  The full application of this logic would have 
led to a system based on pay-per-view since this was the ‘only system’ under 
which viewers could ‘register their preferences directly’ for particular types of 
programming.  On the supply side, liberalisation implied ‘freedom of entry for 
any programme maker who can cover his costs or otherwise finance his or her 
production’ and the imposition of public utility-style common carrier obligation 
upon operators of transmission equipment.
70   
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This  did  not  happen;  instead  the  Peacock  report  also  found  a  place  for  the 
concept of public service broadcasting, arguing that consumers were willing to 
fund television production ‘in their capacity as voting taxpayers’ in order to 
achieve greater diversity and quality of programme production, and that ‘public 
support of programmes of this type can be accepted by those who believe that 
viewers  and  listeners  are  in  the  last  analysis  the  best  judges  of  their  own 
interest’.
71  The White Paper of 1988 and the Broadcasting Act 1990 therefore 
stopped short of imposing complete liberalisation.  However, a key part of the 
new structure was a requirement that the BBC and ITV should contract out 25% 
of their programme making by volume to independent producers; as the White 
Paper  put  it,  ‘independent  producers  constitute  an  important  source  of 
originality and talent which must be exploited and have brought new pressures 
for efficiency and flexibility in production procedures’.
72   
 
Vertical disintegration within the BBC took the complementary form of internal 
administrative arrangements under which a series of producer-provider splits 
were implemented.
73  The context for these reforms was a perception by senior 
management,  and  in  particular  the  then  Director-General  John  Birt,  of  the 
limitations of the traditional organisational structure of the corporation, which 
saw the BBC as ‘a vast command economy; a series of entangled, integrated 
baronies,  each  providing  internally  most  of  its  needs;  all  the  many  faceted 
inputs to the complex business of programme making; programme departments, 
resource facilities and support services, all separately and directly funded’.
74  
With this diagnosis of the problems facing it, the BBC entered into a two-phase 
programme  of  reform.  The  first  stage,  known  as  Producer  Choice,  was 
introduced in April 1993. It essentially took the form of a purchaser-provider 
split at the level of the relationship between programme makers and suppliers of 
production  resources.    The  purpose  was  two-fold:  to  enable  the  BBC’s 
management  to  obtain  information  on  the  indirect,  overhead  costs  of  its 
programmes,  in  particular  accommodation  and  capital  depreciation,  and  to 
benchmark the costs of internal resource provision against those of external 
providers, so making it possible to carry out market testing.  By these means, 
potential inefficiencies would be identified and costs brought under control. The 
second stage involved the introduction of a number of separate internal units or 
‘directorates’ in the autumn of 1996.  Programme makers were allocated to the 
Production  directorate  and  commissioners  to  the  Broadcast  directorate.    An 
internal commissioning system for television production was then put in place, 
to operate in addition to the 25% external quota which had been imposed by 
legislation.    The  imposition  of  the  external  quota  was  one  of  the  principal 
factors behind the decision of BBC managers to introduce an internal market of 
their own. 
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To  critics  of  the  pre-reform  BBC,  the  absence  of  choice  and  competition 
implied that producers had the power to set their own agenda for programme 
content and quality:  
 
‘British broadcasting was effectively run by producer elites, while 
the economic rewards went disproportionately to the workforce. 
This  unusual  arrangement  arose  from  the  twin  features  of 
monopoly funding and a Reithian ethos - television should be good 
for you. The definition of what was good for you was left to the 
programme  departments  of  the  BBC  and  ITV  companies,  self 
perpetuating  oligarchies  which  shared  a  common  value  system, 
supported by managements and regulators who themselves started 
their careers in the broadcasting organisations’.
75 
 
At the same time, this ‘common value system’ sustained production capabilities 
of a certain kind.  These can be understood not simply in terms of the extensive 
training system which the BBC operated during these years, but also in the 
shared knowledge and values which it perpetuated.  The advent of Producer 
Choice,  the  producer-broadcaster  split  and,  more  generally,  regulatory 
encouragement of the independent sector, marked a fundamental challenge to 
these established values.   
 
Paradoxically, it was the apparently monolithic BBC which had provided the 
setting  for  a  latter-day  guild-like  culture  to  flourish.    The  sociologist  Tom 
Burn’s longitudinal studies of the BBC, carried out in the 1960s and 1970s, 
stressed  the  degree  to  which  BBC  staff  during  this  period  ‘seemed  to  be 
devoting themselves - and consciously so - to individual ends and values which 
were  consistent  with  those  of  public  service  broadcasting  without  being 
necessarily derived from them’, thereby creating what a personnel manager of 
that earlier era called ‘an increment you don’t pay for’.
76  The nature of the 
issues involved here can be gauged by this comment on the 1990s reforms, 
made by an employee representative: ‘when the independent quota came in, and 
outsourcing of cleaning, catering and security began, most employees, far from 
saying “what an opportunity”, were fighting to hold on to their jobs,’ with the 
result that ‘it was like working for any other broadcasting organisation; it didn’t 
matter to the staff that it was the BBC any more’.
77  
 
As the quotation we referred to earlier from John Birt makes abundantly clear, 
the reorganisation of the BBC which began with Producer Choice was viewed 
by  its  proponents  in  terms  of  a  shift  away  from  this  producer-led, 
bureaucratically-driven  production  process,  which  was  said  to  be  stifling 
creativity.  The introduction of market-like processes and flexible organisational   15 
forms would, it was hoped, release creative abilities and enhance innovation.  
The same perspective was at work in the efforts made to promote the growth of 
the  independent  sector.    In  this  context,  one  of  the  other  public  service 
broadcasters, Channel 4 – which had always relied on external producers to 
supply its programmes – was held out as an example of what could be achieved 
in  terms  of  innovative  production  through  reliance  on  externally  sourced 
production.   
 
In each case, however, there was more at stake than a straightforward move 
‘from firm to market’.  Peacock’s proposal to empower the ultimate consumer 
would have implied complete ‘unbundling’ of production from distribution, the 
break up of the BBC and the ITV companies, and a move to individualized pay-
per-view.    This  was  rejected  as  a  series  of  steps  too  far,  on  grounds  that 
included the ill-defined but nevertheless still powerful notion of ‘public service 
broadcasting’.  Instead, what emerged was a ‘quasi market’ in which separate 
production  and  commissioning  stages  were  established  within  organisational 
boundaries in the case of the BBC, and beyond them in the case of outsourcing 
to the independent sector.  In the late 1990s the internal market of the BBC was 
stabilised through the use of guaranteed output deals, which protected in-house 
suppliers  while  limiting  the  scope  for  influence  on  the  part  of  the 
independents.
78  But more recently, in part as a consequence of government 
pressure  for  reform  of  the  BBC,  there  has  been  a  renewed  emphasis  on 
externalisation of production functions, leading to a further increase in the share 
of production available to the independent sector,
79 and downsizing within the 
organisation.   
 
Within the independent sector, at the same time, there has been a move away 
from guaranteed supply contracts, in favour of a reallocation of property rights 
under the terms of trade governing broadcaster-supplier contracts.  The effect of 
this  to  ensure  that  intellectual  property  rights  to  the  re-use  of  television 
programmes vest in the programme makers and not the broadcasters.  This has 
enabled  a  small  segment  of  the  independent  sector  to  build  up  a  valuable 
economic resource in the form of secondary and tertiary rights to sell on the 
right to broadcast the programmes they make, and this has led, in turn, to an 




According  to  a  review  of  independent  sector  carried  out  by  the  industry 
regulator, the Independent Television Commission (ITC) in the early 2000s, ‘a 
healthy and competitive TV programme supply market is a vital part of our 
creative economy’,
81 and this in turn requires an independent sector which is 
‘viable and sustainable in its own right, rather than reliant on the quota for its   16 
existence’.
82    Pointing  to  the  successes  of  the  reform  process,  the  review 
claimed that the UK has ‘strong production capabilities’ in part due to the role 
firstly of Channel 4 and then of the independent production quota in ‘[opening] 
up the programme supply market to many hundreds of independent producers, 




But the review was also required to acknowledge that, in many respects, the 
current industry structure was less than ideal:  
‘the  independent  production  sector  remains  fragile  –  producers 
lack the scale to diversify their risk, and lack the rights base which 
would  allow  them  to  attract  external  finance  –  only  a  few 
independents  have  been  able  to  grow  sizeable  and  sustainable 
businesses  at  home;  and  fewer  still  have  made  inroads  in  the 
international marketplace’.
84 
Worse  still,  the  25%  quota,  while  ‘a  success  in  its  original  terms’,  was 
becoming part of the sector’s problems: 
‘it addresses only some of the issues that are required for a healthy 
programme supply market, and has its own disadvantages as well 
as advantages.  Some broadcasters use it as a ceiling not a floor, 
and many have said that it risks creating a “welfare culture” of 
small independents who depend on the quota, rather than their own 
competitive strengths, for their continuing existence’.
85 
The solution advanced by the ITC was one based on the further intensification 
of competition: by limiting perceived abuses of market power  by the BBC, 
moving to terms of trade previously used by the ITV companies, and attempting 
to  disembed  the  commissioning  processes,  the  independent  sector  would  be 
released from the forces holding it back.  The expectation was that as old-style 
‘cottage industry’ firms were sidelined, the survivors, now able to assert control 
over secondary and tertiary rights, would be better equipped to attract external 
capital.   
But  there  is  a  rival  narrative  running  through  the  recent  experience  of  the 
television  production  sector.    The  model  of  cost-plus  financing  which  was 
introduced in the wake of the Broadcasting Act 1990, while making it difficult 
for some of the smaller independents to grow, also protected them from the 
downside  risks  of  cost  shortfalls  which  are  a  common  feature  of  television 
production and which only the larger suppliers have the scale and reserves to 
deal with.  A fully  level playing field for the independents would probably 
require the formal unbundling of the broadcasting and production functions of   17 
the BBC; but as the ITC was compelled to recognise, ‘structural separation of 
the  BBC’s  broadcasting  and  production  businesses  might  have  the  effect  of 
creating  a  more  level  playing  field  between  the  BBC’s  own  producers  and 
independents, but would likely impose significant costs on the Corporation’.
86  
The BBC’s own evolution since the late 1990s, which has seen a significant 
modification of the internal market put in place by John Birt’s reforms, further 
points to the potentially disruptive impact of organisational fragmentation upon 
production capabilities.
87 
If we observe here a role for network-type relations, with a web of contracts 
centred  on  the  ‘nodes’  of  the  main  broadcasting  organisations,  and  a  wide 
variety of organisational forms springing up to meet demands for diversified 
quality  production,  then  we  also  see  the  potential  limits  to  the  process  of 
network  construction  in  a  highly  deregulated  environment.    The  push  to 
marketise  the  sector  has  very  quickly  led  to  concerns  about  the  quality  of 
production,  in  an  environment  where  existing  conventions  of  quality  are 
proving fragile.  The effect of the reforms has been to undermine a ‘guild-like’ 





At the outset of the debate over new forms of economic organisation in the 
1980s, Michael Piore and Charles Sabel
89 argued that vertical integration of 
production was not an historical inevitability, but rather a contingent outcome 
of a particular phase of industrial capitalism; in predicting the re-emergence of 
network forms, they pointed to the possible revival of types of regulation which 
predated the first great ‘industrial divide’ of the nineteenth century.  Twenty 
years on, there is little sign of this regulatory revival becoming a reality.  The 
considerable promise held out by network forms is in danger of being displaced 
by a neo-Schumpeterian view of industry and society, in which technological 
determinism leaves little or no scope for institutional variety.  The crucial issue 
here is the nature of competition policy.  Policy must be capable of recognising 
the  multiplicity  of  forms  which  competition  can  take,  and  the  necessity  for 
regulatory measures to foster the mechanisms which traditionally underpinned 
producer autonomy in the face of hierarchical control on the one hand and the 
homogenising force of mass markets on the other.  This is the case for the return 
of the guild. 
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